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One of the most important aspects of the attempt to understand recent currents in theological 
anthropology in its dialogue with contemporary western cultures, concerns the doctrine of salvation.1 
Gaudium et Spes provides a wonderful case study in this connection. In the context of its own time of 
social and intellectual upheaval, and in looking to address “the entire human family”, one of its most 
overarching themes concerns the salvation of the world at large. As such, it looks to relate the Christian 
doctrine of salvation to the widest human concerns.2   
 
If the same challenge is to be taken up by the Christian community in its own time and context fifty years 
later, it is important to take into account not only the great diversity of views concerning salvation in our 
own day, but to also offer some account of the underlying structures of difference that give rise to this 
diversity. This paper looks to make a contribution to this goal, while also investigating something of the 
soteriological vision of Gaudium et Spes itself and of the implicit metaphysics underpinning it.    
 
I 
The Doctrine of Salvation and the Context of Gaudium et Spes  
What does ‘salvation’ mean, and in what sense is it affected? Can the doctrine of salvation be articulated 
in ways that are accessible to western secular culture, or is the proclamation of salvation in Christ 
(kerygma) counter-cultural by definition? Central to the contentions of this essay is the claim that such 
fundamental theological questions cannot begin to be meaningfully posed without a thorough 
examination of metaphysical issues which are deeply implicated in theological discourses. Any 
soteriological account proceeds from a great many generally implicit understandings of both the 
metaphysics of human being and of Divine transcendence. No contemporary soteriological reflection (or 
indeed theological anthropology at large) can side-step such matters; for even when disregarded they 
continue (perhaps even more profoundly) to shape the terms of the debate. Still less can any attempt to 
bring Christian soteriology into dialogue with contemporary multi-religious and secular societies afford to 
ignore such matters. 
 
There is, and long has been, enormous diversity within the Christian community concerning the nature 
and meaning of the doctrine(s) of salvation.  It is deeply curious, perhaps even ironic, that while 
conceptualisation and articulation of the Christian doctrines of Christ and Trinity were exhaustively 
debated and definitively expressed by the mid fifth century – with such debates and creedal statements 
being filled with the sophisticated ‘state of the art’ Greek metaphysical concepts of the day – the doctrine 
of salvation in Christ as such (surely the very heart of the Gospel) received comparatively scant attention 
during the patristic era. What is more, as J.N.D. Kelly long ago pointed out , “while the conviction of 
redemption through Christ has always been the motive force of Christian faith, no universally accepted 
definition of the manner of its achievement has been formulated to this day”; 3 nor, it should be added, to 
ours. This is especially perplexing considering the fact that perhaps the central consideration operative in 
patristic theological debates – that which was often used to distinguish orthodox from heterodox – was 
precisely the concern to safeguard the primacy of Christ’s role as mediator of salvation. Christological, 
                                                   
1 Throughout this essay, the terms “salvation” and thus “soteriology” will be used in preference to “atonement” or 
“redemption” which arguably carry a more specific and interpretive sense of the ‘work’ of Christ. 
2 See GS, a. 3. 
3 J N D. Kelly. Early Christian Doctrines (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1977), 163  
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Trinitarian and pneumatological doctrines were not developed prior to, but were rather consciously 
derived from, underlying anthropological and soteriological imperatives.  
 
Christian soteriology as such developed little beyond the rich metaphorical allusions of the New 
Testament, which are primarily “evocative” rather than “descriptive”.4 Biblical soteriology works almost 
exclusively through analogical models, each of which operate according to a root metaphor. Dominant 
New Testament soteriological models include those based on metaphors of “battle” (e.g., Col 2: 14ff); 
“law” (e.g., Eph 1: 7; Rom 8: 1); “slavery” (e.g., Mk 10: 45; Rom 6: 15ff); “adoption” (e.g., Gal 4: 4-7; Rom 
8: 12ff); “sacrifice” (e.g., Heb 9: 11ff; 1Jn 1: 7ff); “scapegoat” (e.g., 2Cor 5: 21); “new birth” (e.g., Jn 3: 1ff; 
Rom 6: 1ff); “healing” (e.g., 1Pet 2: 24); and “relationships” (e.g., Rom 5: 10).5 Such imagery is the very 
heart and fibre of Christian soteriology. In speaking directly to the human soul and cutting beneath all 
propositional truth-claims, their evocative power is essential to their effectiveness. But consequently, 
while they orientate Christian soteriology, they cannot in themselves bear the weight of more searching 
analyses. In what sense are human beings in need of salvation, and by what means can/has it been 
affected? Unless one already has a sense of one’s personal (or corporate) need for salvation, and an 
experience of salvation from this state, then it is very difficult to intellectually capture the ‘content’ of 
such soteriological imagery, translating it into conceptually elaborated formulations.         
 
If such biblical imagery is the heart of Christian soteriology, each era is then faced with the task of 
situating and mediating this inheritance within its own context and realities. Gaudium et Spes is a striking 
example of this task in action. Its strongly historically-embedded presentation resonated strongly with the 
tenor of its (and our) time, even while it maintained a strong degree of metaphysical realism.  
 
Before this can be specifically considered (see section 3, below), it is first necessary to explore some of the 
metaphysical parameters of Christian soteriology in general. There are a great many of these, far more 
than can be broached (let alone done justice) here. In what follows, the focus will be on two parameters 
in particular and the way assumptions in these areas determine the kind of claims made concerning 
Christ’s ‘saving work’. The parameters chosen concern the ontology of identity and temporality. In 
focusing on the onto-temporal parameters of Christian soteriology, a range of matters of great import in 
the history of metaphysics will arise concerning the status of universals and the nature of historical 
causation, though again this paper can hope only to scratch the surface of these vastly complex issues.  
 
II 
The Metaphysics of Christian Soteriological Diversity: A Survey 
Typological analysis is particularly well suited to the task at hand, given the way it facilitates a 
systematisation of the bases of difference, as distinct from simply enumerating the instances of 
difference. Relationships among various opposed points of view are presented as part of a larger matrix, 
thus sharpening the understanding of the relationship between diverse views, as well as pointing out 
hitherto unrecognised points of both disagreement and similarity. In this way simple dichotomies are 
opened into a series of related but distinct conceptual issues. While risking of a certain hermeneutical 
violence at the margins, such approach can be very helpful in highlighting a variety of metaphysical issues 
pertaining to traditions of soteriology. 
 
George Rupp’s soteriological typology (outlined in his seminal Christologies and Cultures6) provides an 
extremely valuable framework for analysing the metaphysical roots of the striking diversity within 
                                                   
4 This distinction is central to the philosophy of religious language developed by Ian Ramsey several decades ago. 
See: Wim de Pater, “Religious Language: The Ramsey Model” in André Cloots (ed), Framing a Vision of the World: 
Essays in Philosophy, Science, and Religion (Leuven University Press, 1999), 99-128.  
5 This list is of course far from complete and the references provide only a sample. Further, there is no indication of 
either the subtle distinctions among the various kindred models, or of the intricate way in which New Testament 
texts consistently interweave these categories. 
6 George Rupp Christologies and Cultures: Towards a Typology of Religious Worldviews (The Hague: Moulton, 1974). 
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Christian soteriology. His approach works by plotting two dimensions – identity (realism-nominalism) and 
temporality (transactional-processive) – along different axes,7 and in this way four basic soteriological 
types emerge:   
 
 
REALIST 
 
 
 
Realist-Transactional   Realist-Processive 
 
 
TRANSACTIONALIST               PROCESSIVIST 
 
 
 
Nominalist-Transactional              Nominalist-Processive 
 
 
 
 
 
NOMINALIST 
 
The realist vs nominalist distinction (identity axis) is continuous with the great medieval debates over the 
status of universals; that is, whether collective nouns (e.g., in this case, ‘humankind’ and ‘sinners’) signify 
realities transcendent to language and thought, or whether individuals alone exist. The repercussions of 
this debate for the understanding of the universality of the fall and redemption, are clearly enormous. 
Accordingly, realist theologies of salvation assume or rely on notions of ‘real’ collectivity with regard to 
fallen and saved humanity. Such a metaphysics makes it possible to speak coherently of Adam’s individual 
action having a lasting corporate effect on the whole of humanity, as well as Christ’s actions reconciling 
the whole of humanity to God. On the other hand, nominalist soteriologies function without recourse to 
such universalist assumptions, focusing instead on the fallenness and/or salvation of individual people 
and/or particular communities. On this account, only individuals (or perhaps individuals in immediate 
community) exist, and consequently salvation can only be affected at this level.  
 
If the identity axis concerns the possibility of trans-personal collectivity, the temporality axis relates to 
possibilities concerning historical fulfilment, and the focus here is on understanding of the effect of the 
Christ event in history. Accordingly, Rupp defines a transactionalist approach as one in which “final 
religious value in some sense transcends historical life”,8 in which (to elaborate somewhat) a single 
historical or metahistorical event can have a determining ‘in-principle’ influence on the whole of history, 
quite independent of its actualisation in the historical process itself. Thus, the life, death and resurrection 
of Christ had (and have) a determining “transhistorical” effect on the whole of history, even if this needs 
to be appropriated by each individual in order to be actualised. On the other hand, the processive 
approach sees meaning only in historical particularity – in temporal change and development – whether 
or not any over-arching determinative ‘end’ or historical teleology is perceived. Hence, the effects of the 
life and death of Jesus are mediated only through on-going changes and developments in history: through 
the agency of socio-cultural, institutional and intellectual movements, through individuals who have been 
profoundly moved by their encounter with the Christian story, and/or through the direct oversight of 
divine providence. 
  
                                                   
7 The naming of the axes and their representation above is my own (not Rupp’s). 
8 Rupp, Christologies, 7. 
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In what follows, following Rupp’s own lead in this regard, various scriptural, historical and recent 
theologies of salvation will be discussed in the context of their exemplification of one of the quadrants 
identified above.  
 
Realist-Transactional [RT] Quadrant 
The RT approach represents a central biblical and patristic understanding that is deeply in accord with 
both the earliest Christian evangelists’ conviction about the absolute and concrete change in the human 
situation wrought by the life and death of Christ (ontology), and the paramount scriptural motif of the 
God of Israel’s decisive interventions in history (temporality). The idea that the death-resurrection of 
Jesus irrevocably changed the human condition vis-a-vis God, is found throughout scripture, from texts 
which operate primarily out of the ‘redemption’ model, such as Col 1:13-14, to those which explicitly 
invoke the idea of sacrifice, such as Heb 9:11 and Rom 3:23-25.  
 
According to this approach (and not withstanding the Pauline “effective through faith” qualifier, discussed 
below), the Jesus-event is understood as having an ontologically and cosmically significant impact on 
humanity as a whole, somehow changing the very nature of the human condition and our relationship 
with God. Change and development throughout history are interpreted as consequences of the single 
ontological ‘event’ or salvific transaction of the cross-resurrection. The transactionalism of these 
approaches is logically underpinned by their realism. Just as Adam and Eve are understood to represent all 
humanity in their succumbing to sin and death, so too Christ’s representative humanity serves as the 
mechanism by which all people are objectively redeemed from this state. For without the idea that Jesus 
acted on behalf of all humanity, the whole death-resurrection drama loses its trans-historical significance, 
and is rendered a purely personal triumph.  
 
On the whole, patristic soteriology is characterised by a general RT approach. Fundamentally RT 
assumptions are implicit across a range of patristic soteriologies: from the ‘satisfaction’ approach of 
Hiliary of Poitiers, to the sacrifice-ransom understanding of Cyril of Alexandria, to the “fishhook” theory of 
Gregory of Nyssa, Rufinus of Aquileia and Gregory the Great (according to which Christ’s Divinity served as 
the “trap” hidden in the “bait” of Jesus on the cross, thereby deceiving the devil and breaking the gates of 
hell9). Athanasius provides a vivid example of this approach which is unthinkable without a thoroughly RT 
metaphysics:  
Since [Christ] has come into our realm and has dwelt in a body similar to ours, now every 
machination of the enemy against men has ceased and the corruption of death, which 
formerly held power over them, has been destroyed. For the race of men would have 
perished, unless the Lord of all and saviour, the Son of God, had come to put an end to 
death.10  
 
Anselm’s Cur Deus-Homo? is similarly underpinned by an eminently RT metaphysics. For Anselm, the 
infinite seriousness of human sin meant that the offence to God could only be removed by a ‘God-
human’: human since we were the offending party, and Divine since an act of infinite value was required. 
The salvific event of Christ’s death is a ‘transaction’ (in this case, amends for offence) underwritten by the 
realist notion of Jesus’ representative humanity.  
 
                                                   
9 See, Alister McGrath’s A Christian Theological Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 180.  
10 Athanasius “De Incarnatione”, in Thomson, R W. (ed; transl) Athanasius: ‘Contra Gentes’ and ‘De Incarnatione’ ix 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 155. 
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Karl Barth’s enormously nuanced soteriology outlined in his “Doctrine of Reconciliation”,11  represents 
one of the most systematic and uncompromising RT approaches in recent theology. 12 First, there is an 
uncompromising realism at the heart of his approach. Christ is mediator in an absolute sense: “the middle 
point in which the sovereign act of the reconciling God and the being of reconciled man are one”;13 he is 
God and man and “in the unity of the two, the guarantor and witness of our atonement.14 Indeed, 
presumably in reference to Bultmann style NT approaches (see below), he even speaks of the need to be 
“on our guard against” approaches which treat Christ “in a purely ‘nominalistic’ way, as a formal historical 
or symbolical sign of the event of atonement”, countering that “[t]his event ... corresponds not only to 
cognition but Being ... necessarily enclosed in [Jesus] ... tak[ing] place in Him”.15 Jesus Christ is not to be 
understood merely as “one man side by side with many others ... [but as] the One, whose existence 
necessarily touches that of all other men”; for there is an “ontological connection between the man of 
Jesus on one side and all other men on the other”. 16  
 
This raises a central difficulty for any soteriological realism, and characteristically, Barth faces it head on: 
viz, the dual assertion of the ‘in principle’ achievement of the cross, alongside the fact of continuing sin 
and death. While he acknowledges the distinction between the ‘objective’ achievement of the cross and 
the need for the individual’s “recognition, acknowledgment and acceptance of [God’s] verdict”,17 he 
struggles with the vast problem raised by the very possibility of the individual’s refusal that seemingly 
negates “the Divine Yes spoken by Jesus Christ”.18 Soteriological realism makes sin all but 
incomprehensible, for how can the continued reality (indeed, the rude health!) of the very phenomenon 
objectively defeated by the cross be explained? Barth describes it as “an impossible possibility”.19  
 
Second, the essentially transactionalist nature of Barth’s theology is clear: the Christ even was a once-only 
event in history that changed everything. “The atonement”, as he puts it, “is history. [We must] know it .. 
think of it .. speak of it as such. To try to grasp it as supra-historical or non-historical truth, is not to grasp 
it at all. It is truth actualised ... not revealed ... in history.20 Or as he puts it elsewhere, it is “not a 
repeated, let alone a general occurrence [for] there is no other reconciliation of the world with God for 
any other man, than that which took place in this One”.21 As for the precise nature of the reconciling 
action that took place in Jesus, Barth seems far less concerned. While seemingly preferring Anselmic 
language of debt and restoration of order,22 he also deals with the ‘Christus Victor’ model and a range of 
scriptural models, arguing that a variety of conceptions are possible.23 The crux of his understanding of 
the transactional ‘how’ of the salvific work of Christ, is simply that it be understood as God “do[ing] that 
which is sufficient for the taking away of sin, to restore order between himself … and His creation”.24 
 
                                                   
11 It is a moot point whether it is even permissible to speak of ‘Barthian soteriology’ as such, for the very structure 
of his Christology means that any clear distinction between the “person” and “work” of Christ is to be avoided by 
definition. See Barth Church Dogmatics (CD), IV(i) (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1956), 124-125.  
12 It is of course impossible to do justice to the vast nuance of Barth’s account here. One might, for instance, gesture 
toward the theme of eschatological consummation in his thought and see faint echoes of Irenaeus. But such 
typological contraindications should to be read in the context of his strong metaphysically RT assumptions.  
13 Ibid., 123. 
14 Ibid., p.79. 
15 Ibid., 123.  
16 Barth, CD, IV(ii) (Edinburgh, T&T Clark, 1956), 36; 275. See also his theology of “election”. 
17 Barth, CD, IV(i), 93. 
18 See Ibid., 138-45. Quotation on p.145.  
19 Barth, CD, III(iii), quoted in Rupp, Christologies, 55.  
20 Barth, CD, IV(i), 157.  
21 Ibid., 254-55. 
22 Ibid., 250ff. 
23 Ibid., 170-83.  
24 Ibid., 254-55.  
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 Realist-Processive [RP] Quadrant   
Soteriological positions underpinned by a realist-processivist metaphysics speak of the cross and 
resurrection (often in conjunction with incarnation and other divine salvific moments) as an event of 
cosmic significance that is teleologically ‘worked through’ history, a process that will evenually reach 
eschatological fulfilment. In this way, God’s saving work is a function not simply of a once-and-for-all 
overcoming of evil in the death and resurrection of Jesus, but of a vast historical journey by which 
creation is drawn to back to its source. What is at stake here is not simply an alternative theological vision, 
but a different conception of time and reality as such.   
 
RP soteriologies draw on a range of scriptural passages. Rev 21 presents a vision of Christ as “the Alpha 
and the Omega” of history, “making all things new” (v.5-6). This resonates with the prologue to John’s 
gospel in which the Christ is presented as integral to the world’s creation and salvation in history, a vision 
that is reinforced by various Pauline passages such as the hymns to Christ at the beginning of the letters 
to the Colossians (esp. 1:15-20) and  Ephesians (esp. 1:8-10).    
 
Among patristic theologies of salvation, an eminently RP approach is clear in one of the earliest: 
Irenaeus.25 Certainly, his approach is deeply realist, for a central premise of his thought is of God acting 
decisively in history, not least in the incarnation, death and resurrection of Jesus. However, his vision is 
very different from one in which a single disastrous primeval event is made right by a single reconciling 
transaction in Christ by which reconciliation is affected. For Irenaeus, far from being a matter of a reversal 
to the origin, salvation history is rather the milieu of maturation: from the intellectual, moral, even sexual 
innocence of Adam and Eve26 to the eventual fulfilment of maturity and perfection in Christ at the 
eschaton.27 According to this vision, even the original sin of the first humans was the first painful step 
along the path to maturity. 28 The Old Covenant is presented as an intrinsic stage in the inexorable 
process of God drawing all things to himself, and the life and death of Christ is seen in a similar context.29 
In the meantime, “the whole creation groans and labours with birth pangs” (Rom 8:32). Irenaeus speaks 
of “the long suffering of God” as humanity “pass[es] through all these things”,30 while his vision climaxes 
in a powerful pneumatological soteriology by which the Spirit brings the great human drama to 
completion in immortality and perfection.31  
 
An exemplary contemporary exponent of RP soteriology is Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. Teilhard’s vision of 
Christ as the Omega Point of history has intellectual and spiritual roots that draw deeply on various 
threads of tradition: from Irenaeus, to Darwin to Hegel. 32 Teilhardian soteriology is unambiguously realist; 
as real and objective as organic evolution which is itself part of something much larger and more  
profound. The Teilhardian Christ is the ultimate universal; beyond even the concept of universal 
humanity, Christ is the cosmic reality in whom all individuals exist and move, and toward whom they 
strive. Central to this all-pervasive soteriological realism is an axiomatic commitment to the intrinsic inter-
                                                   
25 It is true that there are moments of ‘transactionalist’ language in Irenaean thought as well, but these this need to 
be understood within the broader picture he presents of God’s on-going salvific action in history, without which – 
presumably – the Christ event alone would be profoundly unfulfilled. For him, the events of the incarnation must be 
seen in the context of the whole history of God’s salvific drawing-forth of humankind, from garden to eschaton.  
26 Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, (AH), III:22(iv) in Roberts. A, Donaldson, J (eds) Ante-Nicene Fathers, Vol 1, (Grand 
Rapids, Michigan: Wm.B. Eerdmans, 1981), 251. 
27 Ibid., IV:38(i), 521. 
28 Ibid., IV:39(i), 522. 
29 Ibid., V:1:(i), 523. See also Gustaf Aulen, Christus Victor (London: SPCK, 1931), 50. 
30 Ibid., III:20(ii), 450. 
31 Ibid., IV:38(iii), 522. 
32 It is worth noting in passing that the figure of Hegel looms large in Rupp’s account of Christian soteriology. On his 
account, Hegel is instrumental in the nascent coming together of realist and nominalist approaches, with Hegelian 
processivism being itself, in some sense, a dialectical fulfilment of the truth of both soteriological realism and 
nominalism.    
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connectedness of all things in Christ. Indeed, salvation itself has no other meaning for Teilhard outside of 
this inter-connected striving, for “I can only be saved as part of the universe”.33 
 
But second, Teilhard’s realism is also programmatically processivist. While he shares with Barth an 
insistence on the influence of Christ as the ultimate ‘in principle’ reality in history, this influence is not for 
him focused on a single transaction in time, but on the whole teleological flow of history. Informed by 
both theology and evolutionary science, Teilhardian thought was revolutionary in its day for its inclusion 
of the larger bio-cosmological context within its theological vision; a process in which the physical and the 
spiritual dimensions are one. All of creation is wrapped up in the salvific work of God in history, with 
humankind being the “leading shoot” of this cosmic evolution.34 In an absolutely Realist sense, Christ is 
seen as the principle and source of the drive of all things toward final unity, and hence the meaning of 
history itself. The Omega Point of organic evolution is the Cosmic Christ. This pan-historical soteriological 
vision is underpinned by a thoroughly teleological (albeit at times messy) process which transforms and 
defines all the particulars of history as it moves toward synthesis. For Teilhard, the cross is most of all a 
symbol – the symbol – in time and space, for the totality of what is going on in the whole of history; 
indeed, “the human epic resembles nothing so much as a way of the cross”.35 But the actual ‘work’ of 
salvation is accomplished not by the cross as such, but by the vast historical process of the Cosmic Christ 
drawing all things to himself.        
 
Nominalist-Transactional [NT] Quadrant  
In turning to the third quadrant – and thus the nominalist bottom half of the typology – what slips away 
are any references to the reality of salvation as either ‘achieved’ or in the process of being achieved per 
se. Salvation is no longer understood to apply ‘in principle’, but only insofar as it is enacted in the life of 
the individual (and to some degree the immediate community of individuals).  
 
While NT soteriologies focus on the cross and resurrection as the core locus of salvation (the 
transactionalist aspect), their nominalism is highlighted in the fact that salvation is seen as affected only 
insofar as it is ‘real’ in the life of the individual. Indeed, except for this reality in/for the individual, it might 
even be said that there is no ‘fact’ of the salvific achievement of the cross and resurrection of Christ at all. 
This approach takes seriously the telling Pauline qualification “effective through faith” in Rom 3:23-25, 
and which is sharpened further by other passages such as Rom 10:9: “If you confess with your lips that 
Jesus is Lord, and believe in your heart that God raised him from the dead, you will be saved”. 
 
Throughout the patristic and medieval periods, distinct NT approaches seem not to have arisen; the 
Pauline qualification having been fully subsumed within the realist accounts of the transactionality of the 
cross-resurrection. Rupp identifies the fourteenth century figure of Gabriel Biel as a key transitional figure 
in this respect, but it is with Immanuel Kant that a sophisticated and distinctively RT position most clearly 
emerges, particularly with his Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone.36 Having systematically 
dismantled traditional metaphysics, Kant was obviously in no position to argue for any kind of a priori 
realist interpretation of the cross-resurrection, and his nominalism is clearly shown by his placement of 
the doctrine of salvation within the context of human morality. For Kant, salvation amounts to a total 
revolution in the individual’s moral constitution from one in which evil holds sway to one in which the 
moral law has victory. Yet this transaction occurs not in time (and is thus not open to empirical 
confirmation), but belongs to noumenal reality.37  
 
                                                   
33 From “Comment je Crois”, quoted in Norbert Wilders An Introduction to Teilhard de Chardin (London: Collins, 
1968), 147. 
34 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin The Phenomenon of Man (London: Collins, 1955), 31.  
35 Teilhard Phenomenon, 313. 
36 See Rupp, Christologies, 56ff. 
37 Ibid., 63. 
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If Karl Barth’s work provides an archetypical recent RT soteriology, then Rudolf Bultmann’s approach 
provides probably the most striking example of a consistently NT account. While Barth’s uncompromising 
realism led him to insist on the objective, in-principle reality of the work of Christ quite apart from its 
subjective realisation in the individual, Bultmann’s strident nominalism refused to allow the historical 
event of the cross any practical reality apart from its ‘subjective’ acceptance in faith. In a 1952 letter to 
Barth, he is very clear on this point:  
 
I can see well enough that in the N[ew] T[estament], the cross of Christ is described as an 
intrinsically significant event which then may be and can become significant for faith too. 
But I cannot follow this sequence, which is possible in mythological thinking, because I 
cannot understand the phrase “intrinsically significant”; I can understand significance only 
as a relation.38  
 
Again, what is at stake here is a fundamental metaphysical point at issue. While sharing a commitment to 
the transactional interpretation of the cross-resurrection of Christ, their differing views about what makes 
‘sense’ metaphysically meant that each theologian had an utterly different understanding of how this is to 
be understood. For Bultmann, the saving transaction takes place – and can only take place – when the 
individual receives the kergyma in faith, for as Walter Schmithals put it, for Bultmann “the word does not 
speak of the saving event, but is itself the saving event”.39 This amounts to an outright denial by Bultmann 
that the historical event of the cross-resurrection is in any way salvific in and of itself. He understands 
such talk as mythological in nature, which when taken literally is quite nonsensical . After all, “it is not 
possible to establish first that Christ’s crucifixion is the saving event and then to believe (for this would 
mean seeing Jesus as Christ before believing him to be so)”. Consequently, “[t]he crucifixion can be seen 
as the saving event ... only in faith”.40 
 
For Bultmann, eternity is present not on Golgotha as such, but (to coin a phrase) in the ‘transaction of 
faith’. This is because an eschatological event is, by definition, one which cannot be tied down to a fixed 
time and place, but rather transcends such categories, being present only in proclamation.41 In this way, 
the eschatological event of the cross-resurrection can be regarded as ‘saving’ only to the extent that they 
are proclaimed and believed to be such.  
 
Nominalist-Processive [NP] Quadrant  
NP soteriologies are the most metaphysically ‘stripped down’, and in this respect there is a strong case for 
seeing it as the one most in tune with the contemporary metaphysical Zeitgeist. This approach de-
emphasises or rejects both the cosmic transactional nature of the cross-resurrection, as well as the notion 
of trans-historical realities or processes. Instead, the focus is shifted to the struggle of individuals and 
communities to work for the salvation of all people under the inspiration of the message of Jesus. 
Consequently, the emphasis is strongly on praxis, and in this connection the death of Jesus is generally 
understood in the context of his life, teachings and example, usually as the historically enacted climax to 
the gospel he proclaimed. Also emphasised is what the death and resurrection of Jesus reveals about the 
nature of God’s loving engagement with humanity; for it is this insight that underpins the ethical 
imperative: the Christian response to the disarming passion of God.   
 
                                                   
38 Quoted in Bernd Jaspert (ed) Karl Barth - Rudolf Bultmann Letters (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1982), 93. It is 
fascinating to read the frank but warm and respectful correspondence between the two, especially given Barth’s 
contention that at the end of the day he had to regard Bultmann’s approach as “heretical” (Jaspert Barth - Bultmann 
Letters, 143). For Bultmann, Barth’s approach was merely “nonsense” (ibid, 95)!   
39 Walter Schmithals, An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann (London: SCM, 1968), 174.  
40 Ibid., 94.  
41 Rudolf Bultmann, “Jesus Christ and Mythology”, in Johnson, R. (ed) Rudolf Bultmann: Interpreting Faith for the 
Modern Era (London: Collins, 1987), passim.  
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An NP perspective emerges through scriptural passages in which Jesus is presented as exemplar, and in 
which action in the world is called forth (e.g., 1Pet 2:21-23). The nature of this action varies from more 
communal (1 Jn 3:16) to more universal (Matt 25:31ff). Nonetheless, the focus is always on present action 
in the world by which God’s salvific action is realised.  
 
Peter Abelard is a key pre-modern proponent of NP soteriology. As with Irenaeus, the distinctiveness of 
his approach is at times masked by the use of traditional RT imagery,42 though it is clear that his 
understanding of such language is sharply nominalistic (centred on the individual’s acceptance of his/her 
reconciliation in Christ’s blood43). But further, in Abelard’s understanding, the motive and effect of the 
cross-resurrection is almost exclusively linked to the revelation of God’s love for humanity. He explicates 
Rom 3:21-25, for example, by wholly equating the revelation of the righteousness of God in Jesus, with 
the revelation of his love; a love “which justifies us before him, or in other words, reveal[s] his love to us, 
convinc[ing] us how much we ought to love him ‘who spared not even his own Son’ “.44  
 
Since, for Abelard, the cross is purely the result of God’s free choice to reveal himself to humanity, and in 
particular the depth of his love, thereby calling forth a response of self-giving love in return, he explicitly 
rejects any soteriological approach which speaks either of God’s compulsion to act, or of any quasi-
juridical ‘due process’ or transaction which changes God’s basic attitude towards humanity. After all, in his 
love for humanity God is free to forgive sin at any time. Indeed, he foreshadows something very much like 
the disdain shown by many contemporary philosophers of religion and theologians concerning models of 
horrific suffering that are presented as paving the way for Divine forgiveness, or which are said to serve 
Divine ends:  
 
Indeed how cruel and wicked it seems that anyone should demand the blood of an 
innocent person as the price for anything, or that it should in any way please him that an 
innocent man should be slain; still less that God should consider the death of his Son so 
agreeable that by it he should be reconciled to the whole world.45  
 
In Rupp’s judgment, Abelard’s influence can be traced into modern times via movements such as 
Reformation pietism and English Deism, and individuals such as Italian Reformer Faustus Socinus and 
twentieth century theologian Albrecht Ritschl.46 To this list might be added contemporary theologian, 
Sebastian Moore, who approaches Christian salvation specifically from the angle of human experience 
and the individual’s psycho-emotional encounter with the living crucified and risen Jesus.47  
 
One of the most highly developed examples of a contemporary NP soteriology is that developed by 
Edward Schillebeeckx in his later and major works which show an uncompromising commitment to 
understanding salvation in terms of Jesus’ own authentic personhood, and the consequent gospel 
imperative toward praxis.48 His focus in these works is based on the need for communities and individuals 
to ‘do’ the gospel, to continually work towards the Kingdom of God. The nominalism (or at least the 
                                                   
42 See, e.g., his statement that “God in Christ has united our human nature to himself”; and that we are redeemed 
“in the blood, which means through [the] death [of Christ]”. Peter Abelard “Exp in Epist.ad Rom”, [ER], 2(iv), quoted 
in Weingart The Logic of Divine Love : A Critical Analysis of the Soteriology of Peter Abelard (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1970), 79, 81.  
43 ER, 2(iv), ibid., 81.  
44 ER, 2(iv), ibid., 80.  
45 ER, 2(v), ibid., 88. For contemporary parallels, consider, e.g., the anti-theodicy movement in Christian 
philosophical theology (e.g., Kenneth Surin. Theology and the Problem of Evil. Wipf & Stock, 2004; and D Z. Philips. 
The Problem of Evil & the Problem of God. Fortress Press, 2009).    
46 Rupp, Christologies, 68-72. 
47 See Sebastian Moore. The Inner Loneliness (London: DLT, 1982) and The Fire and the Rose are One (London: DLT, 
1980). 
48 These works include his Christ : The Christian Experience in the Modern World (London: SCM, 1980) and Jesus : An 
Experiment in Christology (London: SCM, 1979). 
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highly-chastened realism) of his thought is seen in his refusal to sanction any notion of an ahistorical, 
acultural ‘universal’ human condition. 49 While at one point he does use a broadly inductive approach in 
suggesting a list of seven “anthropological constants” that delineate general human orientations and 
values valid across a range of historical and cultural contexts50 , this list is far from being intended as a 
definitive outline of universal human characteristics; and they are certainly a long way from any realist 
notion of an essential and unified human essence which can be assumed and thereby transformed by the 
“God-man”. In a similar vein he comments concerning Jesus that “it is impossible to determine whether a 
human being bound by time and history has a universal significance ... for all human beings”.51 He does 
write of Jesus’ simultaneous closeness to God and familiarity with human suffering,52 but this is only a 
pale reflection of a fully-fledged RT Anselmian or Barthian Christ who is “very God and very man”, 
ontologically reconciling the two. 
 
Schillebeeckx’s soteriology is also strongly processivist. Like Hans Kung, he insists that it is Jesus’ life – and 
not  his death as such – which is salvific. The idea of salvation by virtue of Jesus’ execution deeply conflicts 
with his bedrock notion that salvation is salvation from suffering. Suffering thus has no salvific significance 
in and of itself, and he goes as far as to describe the idea that God required Jesus’ suffering “as 
compensation for what we make of history”, as blasphemous.53 The death of Jesus is to be understood in 
the light of his life as a whole, and in this regard his interpretation in Christ has significant parallels with 
Abelard’s understanding. For Schillebeeckx, “we are not redeemed thanks to the death of Christ, but 
despite it”.54 Its salvific meaning is in the fact that it was the “historical expression of the unconditional 
character of [Jesus’] proclamation and practice.55 For Schillebeeckx (as for Liberation Theology generally) 
this becomes the model for praxis: the imitation, through grace, of Jesus’ selfless service in solidarity with 
all people, even unto death.56 Still, Schillebeeckx leaves no doubts about what he sees as the scale of this 
pervasive reality of ‘un-salvation’. In speaking of suffering as “the alpha and omega of the whole history of 
mankind”,57 there is a rejection both of the sweeping optimism of RP approaches, as well as RT schemas 
in which ‘victory’ has already (in principle) been won.  
 
III 
On the Soteriology of Gaudium et Spes 
Against this typological backdrop, what then might be said of the implicit soteriological vision of Gaudium 
et Spes? While a varied approach is evident, what emerges most strongly is an approach underpinned by a 
distinctively RP metaphysics.  
 
The document exudes a processivist sense of salvation history, embedded in the particularity of place and 
in the flow of time. Certainly, there are some instances of transactionalist (indeed RT) language in the 
document, such as images of our having been “emancipated now by Christ, Who was crucified and rose 
again to break the stranglehold of personified evil”;58 of Christ having “won this victory when He rose to 
life, for by His death He freed man from death”;59 of the cross having “reconciled all men with God”.60  
However, vastly more common is the logic of salvation being enacted across time, supported by a 
                                                   
49 Schillebeeckx, Christ, 1-79. 
50 Schillebeeckx, Christ, 734ff. 
51 Schillebeeckx Jesus, 636.  
52 See, ibid, 266-67, 625 and 606-07 respectively. 
53 Schillebeeckx Christ, 728.  
54 Ibid., 729.  
55 Ibid., 794. 
56 Schillebeeckx, Jesus, 310. 
57 Ibid., 725.  
58 GS, a. 2.  
59 GS, a. 18. 
60 GS, a. 78. 
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Christian humanist agenda in which the “thirst for a full and free life worthy of man”,61 the desire for 
justice to overcome oppression, for peace and development overcoming violence and poverty, is met by 
the force of God acting in history.  
 
What is just as striking as the strongly processivist themes, however, is the unhesitating realism of this 
soteriological narrative. On one hand, it is clear that individual human beings (not the least, Christians 
themselves) are called forth to act in ways that address human ills. To this extent there is a clear call 
toward praxis: Christians are reminded, for example, of “their obligation to work with all men in the 
building of a more human world”;62 there is extensive exhortation toward “reforms in the socioeconomic 
realm”;63 of the importance of the guarantee of religious freedom;64 of the obligation to work for peace 
and co-operation among nations;65 and so on. Nonetheless, the reason why this vast agenda of the 
document cannot legitimately be read as an endorsement of a NP soteriological vision is that this would 
be to read these passages in isolation from the substantial theologically realist narrative that is both 
threaded through them, and which structurally forms the basis (in Part I) for this material in Part II.  
 
Thus, beyond the notion of Christ simply as inspiration for such work,66, beyond even the claim that “His 
Spirit offers Man the light and the strength to measure up to his destiny”,67  is the claim that Christ is “the 
key, the focal point and the goal of man, as well as of human history”.68 This unmistakably realist and 
teleological view of history is announced throughout the text. Indeed, the climax of Part I of the document 
contains one of its strongest statements of such a vision, replete with repetition of the quasi-Teilhardian 
language of Christ as “focal point”: 
 
The Lord is the goal of human history, the focal point of the longings of history and of 
civilization, the centre of the human race, the joy of every heart and the answer to all its 
yearnings ... Enlivened and united in His Spirit, we journey toward the consummation of 
human history, one which fully accords with the counsel of God's love: "To re-establish all 
things in Christ, both those in the heavens and those on the earth" (Eph. 11:10). 
The Lord Himself speaks: " ... I am the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the 
beginning and the end” (Rev. 22:12-13).   
 
The effect of this unmistakable RP framework is that other less dramatic passages need to be read in its 
light. For instance, in any reading of the text as an integrated unity, the notion of Christ being “at work in 
the hearts of men through the energy of the Holy Spirit”69 cannot simply be understood as a mere 
rhetorical flourish by which we are simply exhorted to work for justice; instead they become statements 
concerning an immanent teleology at work in history. In this sense, the whole drama of the ‘now and not 
yet’ of history – of the intersection of immanence and transcendence – is being played out here. 
Accordingly, even as the vast teleology by which God is drawing all of creation to himself, there remains 
the billions of individual dramas being played out in human hearts as individuals are called forth to act in 
accord with this world-historical teleology.   
 
IV 
Metaphysical Realism and Christian Soteriology in Contemporary Context 
                                                   
61 GS, a. 9. 
62 GS, a. 57. 
63 GS, a. 63. 
64 GS, a. 73. 
65 GS, a. 79ff. 
66 On this, however, see the passages on Jesus’ life and ministry as such (e.g., a. 32).  
67 GS, a. 10. 
68 GS, a. 10. See also: “By suffering for us He not only provided us with an example for our imitation, He blazed a trail 
...” (GS, a. 22; emphasis added). 
69 GS, a. 38. 
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There is little doubt, I would suggest, that the way Gaudium et Spes situated the Christian Gospel of 
salvation in terms of concrete contemporary socio-cultural, political and economic concerns – framing it in 
terms of “the signs of the times” and the numerous human exigencies of its day – spoke to its time (and 
continues to speak to ours) in a fresh and effective way. Salvation thereby becomes understood as that 
which is happening now in the midst of human history, and in this light everything is important: from the 
decisions of powerful politicians and captains of industry, to events in even the most humble communities 
and family groupings. This rootedness in the here-and-now clearly reasonates with the mood of the times, 
as well as the contemporary tendency in western culture to be underwhelmed and often sceptical about 
the uniqueness (let alone a priori) significance of past events, and unimpressed by indicative truth claims 
about them. Transactionalist language about the significance of the cross-resurrection tends to lack the 
traction and impact it seems to have had in the past when the metaphysical parameters of both the 
popular and educated discourses were somewhat different. Thus, a large part of the reason for the power 
of Gaudium et Spes is precisely its ‘this-worldly’, praxis-orientated and historically processivist orientation.  
 
Nonetheless, what remains essential to its vision is the unrelenting metaphysical realism spanning the 
immanent and transcendent spheres.  A compelling question for our own time concerns the extent to 
such realism is essential for any robust Christian account of salvation, and the extent to which 
contemporary Christian thought may – with Schillebeeckx, Kung and others – accommodate itself to our 
metaphysically more nominalistic times. Is this what is meant by heeding the “signs of the times” in our 
own day? Or is this – as many have suggested in various ways – to risk throwing out the ‘baby’ of the 
Gospel along with the ‘bathwater’ of realist metaphysics? How should the Church in its proclamation of 
the Gospel respond to the contemporary “incredulity concerning meta-narratives” characteristic of the 
contemporary intellectual climate (whether or not it is characteristic of the popular discourse – this being 
another question again70)? Was Lyotard speaking perceptively also of the Christian doctrine of salvation 
when he famously wrote that “[t]he grand narrative has lost its credibility, regardless of what mode of 
unification it uses, regardless of whether it is a speculative narrative or a narrative of emancipation”?71   
 
It seems to me that there are two ways of responding to these questions: a conservative and an adaptive 
route. The first is typified in the contention of Pauline scholar J C. Beker who now over thirty years ago 
wrote in defence of the need for Christian proclamation to retain both the word and the worldview of 
Pauline soteriology in order to be true to its teaching. In his Paul the Apostle, Beker argued strongly 
against the proposition that any prevailing worldview should be allowed to interpret biblical teaching; the 
line of interpretation must only go in the other direction: the worldview underlying New Testament 
theology cannot be simply discarded and imported into a contemporary framework without distorting the 
revelation itself. For Beker, the worldview – far from being a mere husk that can be removed – is 
inseparable from the message.72 On this account, it is not a matter of contemporary metaphysics 
reinterpreting the Gospel, but rather of the ‘conversion’ of the metaphysics. 
 
Now it seems to me that Gaudium et Spes, albeit only implicitly, can be read as making a not dissimilar 
claim. “The Church”, it says, “has always had the duty of scrutinizing the signs of the times and of 
interpreting them in the light of the Gospel”. Accordingly, it needs to “respond to the perennial questions 
which men ask ... in language intelligible to each generation”.73 Yet, seen in the light of Beker’s 
contention, this raises the question of the extent to which “the signs of the times” should also be 
understood to call the Church to scrutinise the Gospel in their light?  
 
                                                   
70 Contemporary popular culture is actually quite difficult to read in this regard. At times, it would seem, there is an 
almost alarming lack of critical suspicion concerning all matter of meta-narratives (from politics and economics, to 
cultural truisms, to religious ideas at large). At other times, Lyotard’s diagnosis of the “postmodern condition” rings 
true ever more strongly in our own time (especially among Gen Y) than when he wrote.     
71 Jean-François Lyotard. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Transl. Geoff Bennington and Brian 
Massumi. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 37. 
72 J C. Beker. Paul the Apostle (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980). 
73 GS, a. 4. 
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Much hangs on any response to this question. On it, however, these is space to make just two comments. 
The first is what I take to be the obvious and fundamental point in the light of the last half century of 
progress in philosophical hermeneutics. Whatever answer we might feel is the ‘correct’ answer to the 
question just posed – of whether the Gospel should be read in the light of the times and much as the 
other way around – the truth is that Christians have always done, and must always do, both. As 
Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur and many others taught us long ago, no text may be read in isolation from 
the process of interpretation, a process that is always situated. This site of interpretation is the site of 
dialogue in which the horizons of understanding of both parties are stretched. Dialogue is an inherently 
two-way process, and understanding is calcified when one partner scrutinises the other while remaining 
impervious to the searching questions of its interlocutor. This is no small matter: as history has repeatedly 
shown, the moment religious frameworks of meaning become disconnected from the conceptual life-
world of a people, they lose their authority and are soon discarded.   
 
The second comment is this. In our day, I would suggest, by far the most significant source of theological 
division among western Christians, as well as the most difficult task for proclaiming the Gospel within the 
secular culture at large, concerns the types of issues dealt with in this essay: i.e., the metaphysical 
frameworks for belief. More often than not, such fault lines run across rather than between traditional 
denominational divisions, both transcending and (in certain senses) underlying them. Philosophy thus 
remains as central to theology as it ever was. If it is the case that Christians can only have a soteriology 
that their metaphysics can afford, then metaphysics matters enormously for contemporary (and all 
future) theology.   
 
